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Abstract           
 
Advance warning of pathogen outbreaks has not been possible heretofore. A new class of 
genomic peptides associated with rapid replication was discovered and named replikins. 
Software was designed to analyze replikins quantitatively. Replikin concentration changes were 
measured annually prior to, and “real time” every few days during, the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. Replikins were seen by both linear sequence representation and three-dimensional X-
ray diffraction, and found to expand on the virus hemagglutinin surface prior to and during the 
H1N1 pandemic. 
 
A highly significant increased concentration of virus replikins was found a) retrospectively in 
three pandemics from 1918 to 1999 (14,227 sequences)(p<0.001), and b) prospectively before 
the H1N1 2009 pandemic (12,806 sequences) (in the hemagglutinin gene (N=8,046), p values by 
t-test = 1/10130, by linear regression = 1/1024 and 1/1029, by Spearman correlation < 2/1016, by 
Wilcoxon rank sum<1/1016, by multiple regression adjusting for correlation between consecutive 
years = 2/1022. Rising replikin concentration in H1N1 from 2006 to 2008, predicted one year in 
advance the H1N1 outbreak of 2009; and in H5N1, predicted the lethal outbreaks of H5N1 1997-
2010.   
 
The possible combination of influenza strains H1N1 (high infectivity) and H5N1 (high lethality) 
is a matter of global concern (1,2). The risk of a combined H1N1 (high infectivity) - H5N1 (high 
lethality) outbreak may have increased because first, the Replikin Counts of the two virus strains 
have risen simultaneously, not seen previously; second, the rise is to the highest levels recorded 
since 1918 for H1N1, in Mexico (16.7), and since 1957 for H5N1, in Egypt (23.3); and third,  
clinical outbreaks of each strain are occurring in 2011. These simultaneous conditions may 
increase the risk that the two virus strains might come into contact with each other more 
frequently, facilitating transfer of genomic material to form a hybrid.  
 
*Senior Scholar, Boston University School of Medicine 
**Director, Foundation for Research on the Nervous System (FRNS), 36 The Fenway, Boston MA 02215  
 
 
Introduction 
 
No structures of infectious organisms have been described to date which correlate quantitatively 
and temporally with epidemic outbreaks, course, and lethality, and permit early or advance 
warning of such outbreaks. Replikins are genomic structures related to rapid replication defined 
by the authors’ algorithm: peptides 7 to 50 amino acids long, containing two or more lysines, six 
to ten amino acids apart, at least one histidine, and a lysine concentration of 6% or more (8). 
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Replikins are the first reported conserved virus structures whose increasing concentration 
correlates quantitatively with, and predict, strain-specific virus outbreaks.  
 
As observed in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, advanced Replikins warning was published one year 
in advance, in April 2008 (12).  The outbreak occurred in April 2009. Because of the time taken 
to produce vaccine, vaccine was not available when the brunt of the pandemic struck in April 
2009.  Only 20% of the world’s population at risk had vaccine available, and that was eight 
months after the outbreak, when the virus Replikin Count had already indicated that the lethal 
aspects of the pandemic would soon be over except for a brief recurrence in December 2010, 
also predicted (Figure 1a). Fortunately, so far, the H1N1 pandemic has been less severe than the 
three pandemics in the last century. The 2011 outbreaks have begun for both H1N1 and H5N1. 
Initial ‘scout‘ virus outbreaks of H1N1 have occurred, again in Mexico, with Replikin Counts of 
the Infectivity Gene up to a record 16.7 (see below) and a human mortality rate of 10.7% (2); and 
outbreaks of H5N1 in Egypt, better established, have begun with a current cumulative mortality 
rate of from 34.7% (3,4) to 37.8% (5). It is generally agreed that new approaches are required for 
the control of acute emergent diseases (6.7). Five year plans with the hope to have a vaccine 
available in five years may not be relevant to the current threat (24).  
 
The benefits of having more time to prepare for and to respond to acute lethal environmental 
events has been demonstrated in satellite warnings for hurricanes. The consequences of having 
little or no advance warning have been recently demonstrated in earthquake-tsunamis and in the 
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. To date there have been no reliable technologies to predict 
emergence of specific virus strains.  The only global surveillance available is post outbreak and 
based solely on epidemiological data (1). Acute emergent infectious diseases coupled with 
current global travel pose challenges to timely implementation of public health measures such as 
tracking and isolation of cases, and the design, testing and distribution of specific effective 
vaccines and therapeutics to the world’s population.  
 
Methods  
 
Software based on the authors’ algorithm (9) first identified and then counted the replikin peptides in each 
genomic sequence (Replikin Count = number of replikins per 100 amino acids). For each group of 
specimens’ replikins, the mean and standard deviation of the mean (SD) were calculated and compared 
over the past 93 years. Highly statistically significant increases and decreases were examined, for 
example by strain, host, country, history, year, month or week; by substitution, morbidity, and lethality. 
The terms ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ of Replikin Counts were used only when the p level was less than 
0.001. Counts in H1N1, H5N1 and other influenza strains were each monitored separately, retrospectively 
from 1918 to 1999, and prospectively from 2000-2011 for all countries reporting to Pubmed. During 
outbreaks, Replikin Counts were compared to Counts for the same strain in non-outbreak (‘resting’) time 
periods. Statistical analyses of rate of change, trend, pattern, and growth models in the evolution of each 
virus strain were initiated. Replikin genes were isolated in silico by scanning and identifying those areas 
of the virus genome which had the highest concentration of replikins. When the eight H5N1 genomic 
areas were examined year by year, gene areas were found which became upregulated when associated 
with particular outbreaks. When the upregulation was found to be associated with high infectivity 
(morbidity over time period), the high Count area was named Replikin Infectivity Gene. When a high 
Count area in a sequence was found to be associated with high mortality rates, the high Count area was 
named Replikin Lethality Gene. The Replikin Count of these two genes in the H1N1 virus were 
determined annually from 2001 to 2008 before the pandemic, then during the pandemic ‘real-time’ every 
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few days, then weekly, from April 2009 to February 2011. When Replikin Counts exceeded 5 per 100 
amino acids, stacking was sought and found. Counts were expressed in two ways: 1) for the entire gene, 
e.g. for the entire hemagglutinin gene in H1N1 (as employed in Figures 1-4); and 2) for the highest 
concentration of Replikins within each infectivity or lethality gene, which was designated the Replikin 
Peak Gene (Figures 4 and 5). Human morbidity and mortality rates data during particular time periods 
(CDC and WHO)(10,11) were compared with Replikin Counts.  Replikin peptides were visualized by two 
means: a) by linear display of sequences of contiguous numbered amino acids in the primary structure and 
b) by X-ray diffraction analysis of the 3-dimensional folded structure.  
 
Results 
 
Prospective Prediction of Outbreak Solely from Replikins Analysis 
 
An increase in H1N1 virus Replikin Counts was found before the outbreak of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  
 
A rising mean Replikin Count of the hemagglutinin area of H1N1, between 2002 and 2009, globally from 
3.5 to 9.7, was suggested by data from just one country, Mexico; confirmed in Peru-Argentina, Austria, 
Japan-Vietnam and globally (Table I and II, Figures 1a,1b, 2, 3).  
 
Table 1 – Early warning of coming outbreak by virus Replikin Count increases in human cases 
 over the seven years before the H1N1 2009 pandemic   
 
Year Annual Replikin Counts, Mean +/-SD    Clinical  
           Chronology 
Mexico          Peru-Argentina     Austria        Japan-Vietnam   Global 
2002             3.2+/-1.7(N=11) 3.5+/-1.9(N=65) Few H1N1 
2003 3.6+/-0.6 (N=2) 4.8+/-1.7(N=8)        4.7+/-0(N=18) 4.8+/-1.3(N=92)  sequences 
2004         5.0+/-3.1(N=27)  from cases 
2005       5.2+/-4.5(N=26) 5.0+/-2.8(N=87) were reported; 
2006 5.5+/-0.1(N=2)     5.2+/-1.6(N=16) 4.7+/-2.6(N=145) focus was on H5N1 
2007 6.3+/-1.1(N=2) 7.1+/-0.1(N=12)   8.5+/-2.4 (N=6)    7.4+/-2.6(N=42) 6.1+/-1.6(N=583)  
2008 7.3+/-0.2 (N=2)   7.6+/-1.6(N=47) 8.0+/-1.5(N=67) 6.8+/-1.8(N=444) Authors’ Warning  
2009 10.2+/-0.8 (N=269)  12.2+/-1.3(N=57) 9.9+/-0.5(N=5)      9.3+/-1.1(N=378) 9.7+/-1.9(N=5,899) Pandemic “begins” 
2010 11.7+/-1.5 (N=5)   10.4+/-0.5(N=3) 9.2+/-0.2(N=13) 9.5+/-2.8(N=453) Pandemic “over”. 
-- but persistent high 
Repllkin Count 
predicted otherwise: 
Clinical recurrence 
December 2010 
N = Number of cases with genomic sequence analysis, thus permitting replikins analysis.  
All sequences published in Pubmed were analyzed.  
Authors’ warning April 2008 (12) when Replikin Counts reached the range of the level previously found in the 1918 
H1N1 Pandemic and the 1933-1935 severe H1N1 outbreaks (Figure 4), 
Beginning and end of pandemic per WHO announcements (13) 
 
___________________________________________________
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 Figure 1a: Increasing Replikin Counts (p<0.001) in Human H1N1 Influenza Virus Infectivity Gene 2002 to April 2008 predicted the 
outbreak of April 2009.  Persistence of the elevated Infectivity Gene Count in February 2010 predicted that a clinical recurrence was 
likely and a clinical recurrence occurred in December 2010.  
Replikin        
Count   
 
---Dates in 2009 and 2010 are publication dates of sequences in Pubmed– 1-4 months after the specimens were collected 
-------2001---------------2008-//  2009------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------end2009 //2010------  //1.18.11  
 
Cumulative number of specimens: 
N HA= --------144--------491----//-118-----------------231-------------345---------------------422-------------------------548----------------1,042//--------------------// 8,046------- 
N polymerase=-122---------157-----// 147----------------794------------1,165-------------------1,274-----------------------1,705----------------2,886//--------------------// 4,760----- 
Total N=---------266--------648-----// 265--------------1,025------------1,510-------------------1,696-----------------------2,253----------------3,928//--------------------//12,806-------- 
 
Legend for Figure 1a: Replikin Counts Annually, 2001-2008, followed by ‘real-time’ Counts 2009-2010, every 2 to 3 days, then weekly. 
Replikins Infectivity Count of entire hemagglutinin gene (red, mean=heavy bar, and standard deviation of mean=light bar); 
Replikins Lethality Count of entire polymerase gene (including pA, p B1-F2, p B1 and p B2 frames) (black, mean=heavy bar, and standard deviation of mean=light bar) 
y axis: Replikin Count: (Number of replikins/100 amino acids) 
x axis: dates genome sequences were published in Pubmed  
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Figure 1b continues the analysis into 2011. The Mean Replikin Count (red) of the Infectivity Gene of the 
virus genome shows two major increases: 1) from 2001 to 2009, a 250% increase, before the pandemic 
became clinically apparent; and 2) from December 2009 to January 2011. The Standard Deviation of the 
Mean (SD)(yellow) turned to its ‘resting’ level near zero in January 2010, then increased to greater than 
its 2009 pandemic level. Warning therefore was given in April of 2010 that H1N1 would reoccur, which 
it did in December 2010. As of January 18, 2011, the Global Mean Replikin Count for the Infectivity 
Gene had reached 14, and the SD had reached 4.0, both the highest respective values recorded for H1N1 
since the major outbreak of H1N1 of 1930-1933. In Mexico, the Count had reached 16.7.
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 Figure 1b – Infectivity Gene Activation 2001-2009, and 2010-2011 
-------Pre-Pandemic------------//  Pandemic----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------//-------------------------Clinical-//----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Recurrence//--- 
------2001--------------2008  //  2009-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------//2010---------------------------
//2011 
Replikin 
Count
 
----Dates in 2009 through 2011 are publication dates of sequences in Pubmed– 1-4 months after the specimens were collected  
Legend for Figure 1b: H1N1 Infectivity Gene: Replikin Count, Mean (red):  Standard Deviation of the Mean (SD, yellow). 
Mean increased from Replikin Count of 3.5 in 2002, to 7 in December 2008, to 10.1 before the clinical outbreak in January 2009, to 13 after the clinical recurrence in December 
2010. SD increased from Replikin Count 1 to 3 in 2004; then the mean increased before the clinical outbreak in 2009. Before the recurrence in 2010, the SD of the Replikin Count  
increased from 0 in January 2010 to almost 4 in June, 2010,  and the mean again followed, from 8 to 10 for the H1N1 clinical recurrence in December  2010.
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 Figure 1c shows that the Replikin Count of the replikins Lethality Gene (black), in the polymerase area, increased before the onset of the pandemic 
in April 2009, first in the SD in 2006 and 2007, then in both the mean and the SD in specimens of December 2008 and January 2009. Rapid 
reduction in Lethality Gene Replikin Counts, Mean (black) and SD (green) occurred in virus specimens from January to April 2009, and continued 
until the pre-pandemic Count levels of July 2008 were reached in October 2009. The mortality rate reported from Mexico was initially 27%, then 
following the Replikin Count, rapidly decreased in Mexico and elsewhere, to less than 1% (14,15).  
 
Figure 1c –Lethality Gene Activation December 2008 to January 2009 
H1N1 Lethality Gene (Mean Replikin Count, black;   Standard Deviation of the Mean, SD, green)                                                                                                                            
SD Peaked 2004 to 2007, and again in 2008 before the clinical outbreak in Mexico in 2009, and again in 
April 2009, 12 months before the Mortality Rate peaked in the world (WHO), and 6 months before the 
U.S. Paediatric Mortality Rate peaked (CDC). 
-----------Pre-Pandemic-------//   Pandemic-----------------------------------------
  
----------------------------------Dates in 2009 through 2011 are publication dates of sequences – 1-4 months after specimens were collected 
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The rate of change in the course of a different virus outbreak, that of the coronavirus SARS in 2003, was compared to the rate of change in the 
H1N1 2009 pandemic. In contrast, in SARS, after the predictive increase in the Replikin Count of the virus spike protein in 2002, before the 
clinical outbreak in 2003, the decrease of the Replikin Count occurred almost immediately, at the beginning of 2003 (compared to failure of H1N1 
infectivity to decrease after 2 years). The total duration of the SARS outbreak also was shorter - approximately 9 months. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Independent Statistical Analysis by Todd MacKenzie, PhD, Associate Professor of Biostatistics, Dartmouth Medical School  
 
Methods 
 
The variable of primary interest is Replikin count. The unit of analysis is a specimen, designated by Accession Number in PubMed. The Replikin 
count was calculated as the number of Replikins per 100 amino acids. The goal of these analyses was to assess changes in the distribution of 
Replikin count by year over the calendar period 2001-2010, overall and within specific time windows; 2001-2008 (up to the year before the H1N1 
pandemic of 2009), 2006-2008 (the three years before the pandemic), 2009 vs 2008, and during the pandemic, 2010 vs 2009. Analyses used year 
of specimen collection because month and day were available for less than 10% of specimens during the years 2001-2009.  Replikin count is 
analyzed as a continuous variable, although we do report frequencies of some specific values because the distribution exhibits a discreteness 
suggesting it is a mixture distribution. Statistical analyses consisted of linear regression of Replikin count on year, Spearman correlations, as well 
two-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests to compare means between two different years. These analyses assume that Replikin counts are 
independent between specimens. It is possible that there is a temporal correlation (e.g. correlation of specimens taken close together in time), but 
assessment of temporal correlation is difficult without day, or at least month of specimens. Existence of a temporal correlation, would lower the 
level of significance. For the analysis of a slope between years 2001 to 2008 multiple regression was used to test for a slope over time while 
adjusting for the mean level of Replikin counts in the year before in order to remove any temporal correlation between successive years. 
 
Results 
Table II - Descriptive Statistics for Replikin H1N1 HA by Year 
        N Minimim  25%* Median   Mean   75%*  Max St.Dev      SEM^ 
2001   91    3.2   3.20   3.20 3.4758  3.200  6.4 0.74391 0.077983 
2002   14    3.2   3.85   4.25 4.4571  5.500  5.5 0.93703 0.250430 
2003   89    0.3   4.10   4.70 4.8573  5.500  9.8 1.29910 0.137710 
2004   19    3.5   6.40   6.40 6.5789  8.100  8.1 1.59150 0.365110 
2005   60    0.3   4.10   5.50 5.7583  6.275 10.1 2.61550 0.337660 
2006  127    0.3   4.00   4.50 4.5378  6.400 10.2 2.68380 0.238150 
2007  546    0.3   5.50   5.50 6.0015  7.075 13.2 1.52370 0.065209 
2008  414    0.3   6.50   6.60 6.7222  7.300 13.2 1.80100 0.088515 
2009 5141    0.3  10.00  10.10 9.8686 10.200 18.6 1.49490 0.020849 
2010  399    0.9   9.20  10.10 9.5128 10.600 27.5 2.87850 0.144100 
* Percentiles 
^ Standard Error of the Mean 
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Figure  2 : Distribution of Replikin Counts in H1N1 HA with mean and se from 2001 to 2010 
 
 
 
Legend for Figure  2 - The discreteness of the Replikin count distribution is evident in Figure 2. The value of 10.1 occurs in 47% of the 5141 specimens in 
2009. The value of 5.5 occurs in 43% of 546 specimens in 2007. The value of 0.3 occurs in 23% of the 127 specimens in 2006.  
Between years 2006 and 2008 the count increased a mean of 1.0 (95% Conf. Int. 0.8 to 1.1) per year which was statistically significant: p-value (linear 
regression) = 1/1029, p-value (Spearman correlation) < 2/1016 
  Between years 2001 and 2008 the count increased a mean of 0.4 (95% Conf. Int. 0.3 to 0.5) per year which was statistically significant: p-value (linear    
regression) = 4/1024, p-value (Spearman correlation) < 2/1016 , p-value (multiple regression adjusting for correlation between consecutive years) = 2/1022 .  
  The increase in mean counts between 2008 and 2009 was 3.1 (95% Conf. Int. 2.9 to 3.3) which was a statistically significant increase: p-value (t-test)=1/10130,    
p-value(Wilcoxon rank sum)<1/1016  
  From 2009 to 2010 there was a small decrease of 0.4 (95% Conf. Int. 0.1 to 0.6,  p-value from t-test=0.0151, p-value (Wilcoxon rank sum)=0.010.  
 
  Conclusion Independent Statistical Analysis 
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Replikin counts increased 2 fold between the years 2001 and 2008, with much of the increase between 2006 and 2008, and they increased significantly between 
2008 (the year before the pandemic), and 2009 (the year of the pandemic). They decreased slightly between 2009 and 2010.  The distribution of Replikin counts 
appears to be dominated by a handful of modes, or 10 to 20 classes. This suggests that there are a handful of variations of the virus, such that for specimens 
within a class the Replikin count is identical. The increase in the proportion of classes with high Replikin counts accounts for the increase in mean Replikin 
counts leading up to the pandemic. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Virus Replikins Visualized Before and During the H1N1 Pandemic of 2009 
 
The presence and position of the replikins in the H1N1 hemagglutinin gene area prior to and during the course of the H1N1 pandemic were 
visualized as well as counted. Table II shows that as the Replikin Count increased from 3.2 in 2002 to 11.7 in 2010, a substantial structural change 
occurred, most evident in the HA1 area, from amino acid 1 to 276, in which more Replikins appeared, increasing from 0 to 34 in number per 100 
amino acids. At the same time, the presence of ‘free’ K’s and H’s (not within replikin structures) in the same HA1 area, decreased from 20 to 0.  
As the number of replikins increased, they were found to increase on the surface the hemagglutinin gene.  
 
Table III:  Replikins Counted in Primary Linear Hemagglutinin Gene Structure:  
Increase and Reorganization Before and During the 2009 Pandemic.  
 
The number of Replikin structures increase as Non-Replikin (‘free’) K’s and H’s decrease in HA1 and HA2 segments of the Hemagglutinin Gene 
       Year   2002 2008 2009 2010 
a) Replikin Count Increase in Entire Hemagglutinin  
Replikin Count  (No. replikins/100 amino acids)  3.2 5.5 10.1 11.7   
in entire Hemagglutinin unit 
 
b) Appearance of New Replikin Structures in HA1 and HA2 Regions 
In HA1 Region: 
No. of replikins in HA1 (amino acid nos. 1-276)     0 13 28 34  
No. of non-replikin (‘free’) K’s and H’s in HA1 (1-276) 20 16 4 0    
In HA2 Region: 
No. of replikins in HA2 (amino acid nos. 277-565)  18 18 30 32 
No. of non-replikin (‘free’) K’s and H’s in HA2 (277-565) 1 1 0 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a. Three-Dimensional Visualization of Virus H1N1 hemagglutinin shows the increasing appearance of replikin 
structures on the surface of hemagglutinin, and the encirclement of the sialic acid contact area of the virus, as the Replikin Counts 
increased from 3.2 to 10.1 during the pandemic’s development.      
                                                                                                       Replikin Count of  H1N1 Hemagglutinin:    
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Replikins are in cyan. Contact points for the sialic acid host receptor are shown as orange spheres. Note at 3.2 there are 
no visible replikins around the sialic acid. At 5.5 the partial, and at 10.1 the almost complete encirclement of the sialic 
acid site by replikins. The maximal surface coverage is achieved at Replikin Count of 10.1; the surface at Replikin Count 
of 11.7 (not shown) is the same as that at 10.1. 
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Figure 3b - Anti-H1N1 Human Antibody Binding Site (red) is part of the replikins structure (cyan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend for Figure 3b.  Surface representation of influenza hemagglutinin of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic virus showing replikin distribution (cyan) 
and CR6261 antibody (16,17) binding site. The antibody binds on the outer surface of the hemagglutinin with contact on and binding to amino acid 
residues (red) of replikins (cyan). All 18/18 amino acid contact and binding sites in HA2 for the antibody are parts of the additional replikins 
covering the surface in this area at the Replikin Count of 10.1 and higher, but not present at Replikin Counts of 3.2 and 5.5, earlier in the 
development of the pandemic (Figure 3a). 
 
 
 
 
Increased Strain-Specific Replikin Counts Correlate with Pandemics and Outbreaks 1918-2007: 
Retrospective Analysis 1917-2000;  Prospective Analysis 2001-2011 
 
Increases in Replikin Count were observed specifically for each strain, but not for other strains, in those years in which each strain was shown to 
be responsible for the outbreak (p<0.001) (Figure 4).  Replikin Counts of Replikin Peak Genes were examined in all Pubmed records for 
sequences of H1N1, H2N2, H3N2 and H5N1 and Influenza B.  An important natural control is seen in the rarely lethal influenza B over 69 years 
(1940-2009) for which the mean Replikin Count rarely exceeded 4. When one or both of the infectivity and lethality replikin genes are 
upregulated, in preparation for, or in the midst of an outbreak, the Replikin Count increases above 4 (p<0.001)(Figures 1-3, 5; Table 1) and 
replikins increase their presence on the surface of the hemagglutinin gene (Figure 3).  
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Figure 4 : Retrospective: Replikin Peak Gene (RPG) Lethality Gene Replikin Counts 1918-2007 corelate with strain-specific influenza virus outbreaks 
and pandemics            N=14, 227;      p<0.001 
 
     1918    1957      1968                                           1997                          2005-07 
     H1N1               H2N2         H3N2               H5N1                                 H5N1 
    
 
Legend for Figure 4- Influenza B  (pale blue) through 2007 is rarely associated with lethality compared to the A viruses, and does not have a Replikin Count above 4. Mean 
H1N1: (black), mean H2N2: (dark blue), mean H3N2: (green), and mean H5N1 :(red).  Standard deviation of the mean (SD):(grey bars). Note that a virus ‘at rest’ has an absent or 
small SD. Increased Replikin Counts, above 4, are specific both temporally and with regard to the particular strain for each  pandemic or severe outbreak. Spaces indicate years 
where sequence data was not available on Pubmed.   
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Evolution, trans-flu strain sharing, and conservation of Replikins 
 
The substitutions which have occurred in the Goose Replikin  from 1917 and the 1918 H1N1 pandemic to 
2011 shown in Table IV appear to be selective and retained (conserved) rather than random. The 
conservation data from 1917-2004 (1) is updated to 2010 in Table IV.  
 
Table IV: Evolution, trans-flu strain sharing, and conservation 1917 to 2010 
of one 29 amino acid replikin: *The Goose Replikin is a 29 amino acid replikin 
peptide in the hemagglutinin protein of influenza virus beginning with kk and ending 
with hh. All ks and hs are shown in bold type. Individual replikin sequences of 
individual strains of influenza virus containing residues identical to The Goose Replikin 
amino acids in blue;  amino acid substitutions in  yellow and red.  
1917 Goose Replikin*             Year and Virus Strain in 
and Homologues.                   which Each Goose Replikin 
   Peptide Length    Homologue Was Found          
[<--------29 Amino Acids---------]  Year Strain  
kkgtsypklsksytnnkgkevlvlwgvhh  1917 H1N_Influenza Goose Replikin 
kkgssypklsksyvnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1918 H1N1 HumanInfluenzaPandemic         
kkensypklsksyvnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1930 H1N1   
kkgdsypkltnsyvnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1933 H0N1  
kkgtsypklsksytnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1976 H1N1  
kkgtsypklsksytnnkgkevlvlwgvhh            1977 H1N1   
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1979 H1N1  
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1980  H1N1  
kkgtsypklsksytnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1980 H1N1  
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1981  H1N1  
kkgtsypklsksytnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1981 H1N1  
kkgtsypklsksytnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1985 H1N1  
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1991 H1N1 
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1992 H1N1 
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1996 H1N1  
kkgdsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh   1996 H1N1    
kkgssypklsksyvnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1997 H1N1  
kkgssypklsksyvnnkgkevlvlwgvhh   1998  H1N1  
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  1999 H1N1 
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  2000  H1N1  
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  2001  H1N1  
kkgnsypklsksytnnkgkevlviwgvhh  2002  H1N1 
kkgnsypklsksyindkgkevlvlwgihh   2009 H1N1 
kkgnsypklsksyindkgkevlvlwgihh  2010 H1N1 
kkgnsypklsksyindkgkevlvlwgihh  2011 H1N1 
kkgnsypkisksyinnkekevlvlwgihh   1999 H1N2 Influenza 
kkgnsypklsksyinnkkkevlviwgihh   2000 H1N2   
kkgnsypklsksyinnkgkkvlvlwgihh   2001 H1N2   
kkgtsypklsksytnnkkkevlvlwgvhh   2001 H1N2                   
--knglypnlsksyannkekevlvlwgvhh   2002 H1N2 
--knglypnlsksyannkekevlilwgvhh   2002 H1N2 
kkensypklrksiiinkkevklviwgihh        1968    H3N2 Human Influenza Pandemic  
---------------ksykntrkdpaliiwgihh  1979-2003 H7N7 Influenza 
kkgpnypvakrsynntsgeqmliiwgvhh  1957    H2N2 Human Influenza Pandemic 
kkgpnypvakrsynntsgeqmliiwgihh  1957    H2N2 Human Influenza Pandemic 
kknnayptikrsysntnqedllvlwgihh  1959    H5N1 Influenza (Scotland) 
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kknnayptikrtynntniedllilwgihh  1975   H5N1  (Wisconsin)  
kknnayptikrtynntnmedllilwgihh  1981   H5N1  (Minnesota) 
kkgnayptikrtynntnvedllilwgihh  1983   H5N1  (Pennsylvania) 
kknntyptikrsynntnqedllilwgihh  1988   H5N1  (Scotland) 
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  1996   H5N1  (China) 
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  1997   H5N1  (China)  
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  1998   H5N1  (China)  
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  1999   H5N1  (China)  
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2000   H5N1 (China)  
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2001   H5N1 (China)  
kknnayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2001   H5N1 (China) 
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2002   H5N1 (China) 
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2002   H5N1 (Thailand)           
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2002   H5N1 (Vietnam)  
kknnayptikrtynntnvedllilwgihh   2002   H5N2 Influenza 
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2003   H5N1 (Vietnam)  
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2003   H5N1 (Thailand)  
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh   2003   H5N1 (Sindong, China) 
kknnayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2003   H5N1 (China) 
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvmwgihh              2004  H5N1(Vietnam,highlypathogenic) 
kknsayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh              2004  H5N1(Vietnam, highlypathogenic) 
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2004  H5N1(Vietnam, highly pathogenic) 
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2004  H5N1(Thailand, highly pathogenic) 
kknstyptikrsynntnqedllvlwgiqh  2004  H5N1(Thailand,highlypathogenic) 
kknsaypiikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh  2004  H5N1 (China, highly pathogenic)  
kknsayptikrsxnntnhedllvlwgihh  2004  H5N1(China,highly pathog. goose) 
kknntyptikrsynntnqedllilwgihh  2006  H5N1(China) 
kknntyptikrsynntnqedllilwgihh  2007  H5N1(China) 
kknntyptikrsynntnqedllilwgihh  2008   H5N1(China)  
kkdnayptikrsynntnqedllvlwgihh   2009   H5N1(China) 
kkdnayptikkdynntnqedllvlwgihh   2010   H5N1(China)  
 
 
H5N1 Outbreaks and Lethality 
 
H5N1 is very different from H1N1 in terms its infectivity and lethality. H5N1’s infectivity is lower and 
lethality higher than H1N1. During the worst recorded period of H1N1, the 1918 pandemic, the mortality 
rate was estimated to be only 2.5%, whereas the human mortality rate for H5N1 has been reported by 
WHO to be as high as 82% (11). From specimens of 1957, when H5N1 sequences were first reported, 
until 1996, the mean Replikin Count did not exceed 4 (Figure 5).  A slight but statistically significant 
increase in H5N1 Lethality Gene Replikin Count occurred in 1996, in advance of the outbreak in Hong 
Kong in 1997. Where H5N1 outbreaks had previously been in poultry, in 2007 a human outbreak 
occurred.  In 1996, an increase in Replikin Count precursed the 2007 Hong Kong outbreak in which 30 
human cases occurred with a mortality rate of 27%. The Count increased in 2005-2008 (Figure 6) with 
subsequent animal and human outbreaks in Asia and Egypt in 2008-2010 (WHO)(5).   
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Figure 5.  Replikin Counts in H5N1 Replikin Peak Genes in Infectivity and Lethality Genes in birds, 
and for H1N1 in humans, in 2004-2008. 
 
  
 
Prediction of Geographic Location of H5N1 (Avian flu) Outbreak in Indonesia 
Instead of comparing neighboring genes, neighboring countries were compared for the Replikin 
Counts of H5N1 scout infections in humans over several years. In the replikin prediction of 2005-
2006, Indonesia was predicted to be the country that would be worst affected in terms of 
increased human mortality (18). Following the replikin prediction, 277 human H5N1 cases were 
reported and the human mortality rate increased in Indonesia from 40% to 82% (WHO)(11).  
 
Concurrent H5N1 and H1N1 Build-Up in 2011 
Because of the increase in Replikin Count in birds from 2002 to 2008 (Figure 5), and the 
increased Counts in its precursor H9N2 in chickens (19,20), the authors issued a warning in 
January of 2009 that H5N1 outbreaks would surge (19,20). By January of 2010, these H5N1 
outbreaks occured; in addition to outbreaks in birds and chickens in 63 countries (21,22), human 
cases appeared monthly, most prominently in Egypt, where there were 106 WHO confirmed 
human cases and 32 deaths (mortality rate 30%)(25) as of March 16, 2010. Also in March, 2011, 
the case-fatality rate (CFR) was reported to be 34%, versus 60% for other countries with human 
cases (4). Now, as of June and July, 2011 respectively, the cumulative mortality rate is reported 
by WHO to have risen since 2006 to 34.7% (3); and the current mortality rate reported by the 
Egyptian government is 38.7% (36). Globally, as of December 18, 2010, the H5N1 hemagglutinin 
Infectivity Gene Replikin Count had reached its highest level in humans since 1998.  
 
The H1N1 Infectivity Gene Replikin Count had peaked globally in January 2011 at 13.5+/-4.2; in 
Mexico it declined by August, 2011 only to a mean of 11.9+/-2.5 but 3/21 specimens had levels 
of 16.7 (Figure 6a). As stated in a footnote to Figure 1c above, this failure of the Replikin 
Infectivity gene to return to pre-outbreak levels is in marked contrast to the SARS Replikin Count 
which promptly returned to pre-outbreak Replikin levels to signal the end of the SARS outbreak. 
The data strongly suggest that the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 is continuing to develop. 
 
While there were insufficient H1N1 polymerase sequences submitted to PubMed from Mexico as 
of August, 2011, the Global H1N1 Lethality Gene Replikin Count level in humans, which had 
decreased at the end of 2010 to its pre-pandemic level of 2.0+/-0.2, as of August 2011 was again 
increased to 5.6+/-4.9, in the range that it was before the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (Figure 6b). 
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The persistent elevation of the concentration of both the H1N1 Infectivity and Lethality Genes, 
from previous examples, is invariably followed by clinical outbreaks. The current combined 
activation of both the Infectivity and Lethality Genes of H5N1 in 2011 is of concern. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6a                                                                           Figure 6b 
Replikins Infectivity Gene, H1N1, Annually,  
in Mexico Only 
Mean(Blue),SD(Red) 
 
Replikins Lethality Gene, H1N1, Annually, 
Globally 
Mean(Blue),SD(Red)   
Replikin 
Count 
 
Replikin 
Count     
       
         2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011(Aug)               2006   2007  2008   2009  2010   2011(Aug)      
                                    Year                                     Year     
  
    
Legend for Figures 6a and 6b – In Figure 6a, the persistent increase in the Replikin 
Count after the 2009 Pandemic had been declared over by WHO (13), suggests that 
the pandemic is not over. In Figure 6b, as seen in Figure 1a above, the Lethality 
Gene peak increase occurred 2 years before the pandemic outbreak, then declined 
promptly to its pre-outbreak level. However, this has been followed by the 
recurrence in 2011 of a marked increase in Replikin Count again to pre-pandemic 
levels.     
 
Discussion 
  
The Risk of a Combined H1N1-H5N1 Pandemic. The risk of a combined H1N1 (high 
infectivity) - H5N1 (high lethality) pandemic may have increased because of the simultaneous 
rise in the Replikin Counts of each of these two virus strains to their highest levels recorded since 
1918 and the appearance of ‘scout’ virus outbreaks of H1N1 again in Mexico and of H5N1 in 
Egypt. The simultaneous emergence of two virus strains with record high Replikin Counts has not 
been observed previously. All increases observed in the past 93 years have been in only one strain 
(see Figure 4). Simultaneous pandemic outbreaks could bring the two virus strains more 
frequently in contact with each other, facilitating transfer of genomic material to form a hybrid 
with  pathogenic capability of each strain. H1N1- H5N1 combination is now only a risk; it has not 
yet occurred, and it is not certain that it will occur. However, with simultaneous increases in the 
Replikin Counts of each strain, outbreaks of H1N1 and H5N1 are now in progress in Mexico and 
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Egypt repectively (2,41,44), and in preparation to meet this threatened combination, the authors 
have prepared the first completely synthetic TransFluTM Replikins Vaccine against these two and 
the other common influenza strains. TransFluTM was successful in blocking H5N1 (23) in the first 
of its continuing independent trials in the U.S. and elsewhere.  
 
Pan-Influenza Vaccines. A new technology is presented here of Replikins, genomic peptides 
which act as epitopes, conserved and shared inter-strain. These facts of conservation and sharing 
of the newly defined Replikins epitopes were not known, and this unawareness and the believed 
absence of conservation and sharing was the basis of the reason given for decades of not being 
able to make pan-influenza vaccines which could be used from year to year. However, having 
reviewed Replikins’ technology since 2003 from data provided by the authors, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) first confirmed the influenza epitopes earlier defined by specific 
Replikins by landing anti-flu antibodies on them (16). This NIH data was simultaneously 
independently confirmed by studies at Scripps (17).  NIH has now announced that they hope to 
have a pan-influenza vaccine, possibly in 5 years, based on these epitopes (24).  As noted above, 
the  Replikins TransFluTM  pan-influenza vaccine, based on the Replikins epitopes confirmed by 
the NIH, is available now, and is being tested (23). 
 
Improved vaccine production. The need for new vaccines in influenza is widely recognized 
(6,9). The conservation of replikins over time and the sharing of influenza trans-strain replikins 
(ref. 1 and Table V) has been used to design and produce effective solid phase synthetic vaccines 
in as little as seven days, permitting a more rapid response to newly appearing strains (23). The 
first synthetic replikins pan-influenza vaccine was successful against H5N1; it also blocked virus 
excretion, providing for the first time the potential to block the development of H5N1 reservoirs 
(23),   
 
Specific Visible Changes in the Transformation of Virus Structure. Replikins are shown to be 
present on the surface of the hemagglutinin unit and the coverage increased as the Replikin Count 
increased toward the onset and during the course of the H1N1 2009 pandemic (Figure 3a). The 
early visible reorganization of virus replikin structures from 2002 to 2008 (Table II and Figure 
3a) is here shown to occur in advance of and during the pandemic. This change is concomitant 
with changes from neutral to acidic conformation assisting fusion of the virus with the host 
membrane during virus entry (27-30). The actual visualization of Replikins, with the ability to 
count them, supports the reality and practical clinical relevance of Replikin structures. 
Consequences of the surface increase may be: 1) the replikins themselves may contribute to the 
increased infectivity and lethality of the virus by encircling and supporting the essential active 
site of the virus for entry via sialic acid  (Figure 3a). The central role of the sialic acid receptor for 
influenza virus entry into host cells was demonstrated a) in 1959 by the authors by blocking the 
virus entry into brain cells by sialic acid conjugates from brain gangliosides (25), and b) by the 
release of similar sialic acid conjugate decoys (sialoresponsins) by the chorioallantoic membrane 
of the chick egg under influenza attack (26). The molecular definition of the reaction between the 
hemagglutinin unit and the sialic acid receptor pocket of the host membrane was recently 
demonstrated (27-30).  2) The increased surface coverage by replikins may represent an increased 
‘shield’ or ‘armour’ against the immune system of the host (Figures 3a and 3b).  
 
Replikins in other lethal zoonotic organisms and other pathogenic states. The 2010-2011  
Foot and Mouth Disease virus outbreaks were predicted by the Replikin Count in 2009, one year 
previously (31). Lethal pathogens other than viruses also contain replikins; for example, in 
bacteria, such as tuberculosis, and in trypanosomes (malaria)(8). Replikins also play a key role in 
human cancer (8,32,33,34). The authors have postulated that viruses, bacteria, trypanosomes, 
cancer cells and other biological organisms may be carriers or vectors for mobile pathogenic 
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replikin sequences associated with rapid replication (communication in preparation). Some 
replikins are associated with rapid replication in healthy growth throughout biology, as in algae 
and food plants (8). 
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